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Introduction
In a period of significant and rapid changes, healthcare organizations (HCOs) are searching for providing better services through delivering the best quality of care at the lowest costs (WHO, 2000) . Monitoring performance in HCOs appears then evolving over time due to a continuous search for better quality, efficiency and timeliness.
For reducing costs and keeping stuff up-to-date, healthcare managers are using dissimilar management systems to stimulate performance. They are generally devoting their efforts to promote their traditional systems towards a balance between a fast technical evolution, additional exigent patients (Ginter, Duncan and Swayne, 2002 ) and congruence of goals.
However, a limited number of empirical scientific studies examines the role of the major healthcare stakeholders. In particular, few publications deal with issues of stakeholders, the managerial decision-making and the management control processes. While largely integrated in other managerial contexts (Kabwigiri and Van Caillie, 2006) , most of the contingent-based researches ignore the variable "goal ambiguity" and ignore how "competing interests" are perceived by healthcare managers.
So, the main interest of our empirical study is to appraise how healthcare managers can foster strategic "alignment" in chaotic environments. To investigate this subject, we rely first on seminal studies to appraise the role of the main healthcare players and their influence on some organizational attributes. We then consider the managerial awareness and the perception of a suitable management control system (MCS) to promote a strategyfocused organization.
Our methodology is based on a qualitative approach of twenty-two case studies, lead in two heterogeneous environments (Belgium and Lebanon). This method allows to illustrate, for each healthcare player, his positioning within the healthcare systems. Thus, we define how his role, his perception and his responsiveness manipulate the organization's internal climate and shape the design of the performance monitoring systems (PMS). Our findings are expected to add knowledge on the reasons of the choice of adequate MCS, within three different HCOs' structures: university, general/university and general hospitals.
Context and hypotheses
During forty years of hasty evolutions (at the demographic, social, political or economic levels), a transition from an initially simply complex to a turbulent and uncertain environment has shaped the healthcare industry in all nations (Boyne, 2002) . From a holistic perspective, public governments have simultaneously focused essentially their attention on managing the competing demands of autonomy and accountability (Groot, 1999) .
Despite the observed diversities of contexts and intrinsic characteristics, researchers have however highlighted inflated rates of spending that have outstripped the national wealth in many countries.
Governments have elaborated rules and regulations to guarantee the adequate sector's evolution and the organizational survival (OECD, 2006) . So, they have developed rationalized policies to balance the shift of supply and demand for a better care (Alexander, Weiner and Bogue, 2001 ). In many cases, governments seek improvements by using traditional methods such as: When considering the entity level, healthcare authorities become responsible for interpreting, responding to and implementing public policies (Bouillon et al., 2006 ). The healthcare board is then asked to accommodate the complex and often divergent demands of regulations, the multiple market forces, the community's interests and the organization itself (Alexander, Weiner and Bogue, 2001 ). Moreover, his ability to respond to more exigent patients is also required. To spread risk and to deal with the environmental constraints, healthcare authorities are mobilizing then their strategic networks (Gittell and Weiss, 2004) . Generally, their arrangements modify the organizational structures, leading towards mergers, closures and funding restraints (Chan and Lynn, 1998) . In response to both this evolution towards an increasing turbulent environment and this increase of competing demands from the multiple stakeholders involved, HCOs are now asked to provide a cost-effective operational system (a good level of quality within limited budgets, WHO, 2008) , an open, safe and timely outcome (patients' access and length of stay) and a meaningful strategic positioning. Due to their diversities, they react differently, so that researchers are now able to identify several organic structures (Dess and Shaw, 2001 ) to describe the complexity and accounting dissimilarities between healthcare organizations.
As a result to these arrangements, HCOs are now facing consecutive critical crossroads, leading to an ever more formalized structure focusing their efforts on reducing their costs and diverting their savings towards therapy and preventative care. Healthcare managers tend then to implement sophisticated management information systems (Gittel and Weiss, 2004) that can spell performance. Creating an autonomous self-governed hospital in such circumstances is not easy (Gittell and Weiss, 2004) , due to the fact that healthcare administrators have to accommodate the requirements of the providers and regulators, the consumers and contributors (Kaplan and Norton, 1992) . Those stakeholders often generate some competing interests and goal ambiguity (Burgess and Wilson, 1996) and affect the internal decision-making processes.
Having to break a climate of ambiguity intensifies the healthcare managers' need for information (Niven, 2005) . In order to express their strategy into operational terms that can instantly induce the required change and adjust it to the internal and external evolutions, healthcare managers tend then to evolve their traditional MCSs An alignment between all these competing forces may provide them with the necessary impulse for containing costs (Adler et al, 2003) and increasing the potential revenues. But such an organizational innovation can be a source of conflicts between the administrative staff and the medical personnel (Djellal, 2004) . Mainly in this type of institution, delegating "power" is another matter of agreed priorities and goal congruence between stakeholders, and/or "humanistic" individual versus group perceptions (Burgelman, 2002) . Though, the adoption of an organizational structure that assigns delegations can promote the implementation of a contemporary PMS (Djellal, 2004) . Healthcare organizations represent then complex systems that interact with several players. Every involved player has his role and his own influence on the organizational management and performance. Compliant with his position within this system, he is managerially influenced by his culture, his intents and strategies, his responsiveness and the resources that he uses or controls. Hence, if any evolution affects one of these four axes, it shapes the others and it modifies the player's interaction and behavior within his environment (Hubinon, 1998 ). Being at the heart of healthcare organizations, people play then multiple roles that shape the organizational attributes.
However, specific research to date does not illustrate clearly the role of those numerous constituencies. While some research studies deal with healthcare performance in terms of choice and implementation of some indicators (El-Jardali, et al., 2011), scientific studies that clearly associate the role of people, the organizational contexts, the managerial decision-making process and the choice of a specific PMS does not exist in the literature specialized in this field (a theoretical model, illustrated in Figure 1 , elaborated by Rouhana and Van Caillie, 2011). So, in this paper we suggest to go beyond a traditional analysis, and we analyze these institutions as complex systems, accountant for several constituencies who do not often agree together.
Sample and methodology
Our first sample is carried out through a semi-structured questionnaire, adapted from an international scientific survey "The Balanced ScoreCard in HealthCare: an international survey" 1 . We have addressed the Belgian healthcare administrators. After four recalls, we have received the approval of 12 respondents, willing to participate in our in-depth case studies. Our meetings were held with the general and/or the financial managers.
The length of the meetings varied between twenty minutes and one hour. However, we were not able to 1 As a researcher, we are affiliated to an international project collecting data out of 20 countries, initiated since 2007 by the Professor Strefano Baraldi from the "Centro di Ricerche e Studi in Management Sanitario", at the Catholic University of Milan, Italy and the C.E.P.E. Research Center, University of Liege, Belgium. We were responsible of collecting data from Belgium and Lebanon.
generalize our findings based on this sample (Suddaby, 2006) . For this reason, we have conducted a similar collecting method in Lebanon: a second sample of additional 10 respondents to "modestly" generalize our findings and to suggest a "parallel" analysis in two heterogeneous environments.
Since the core issues of our research are to identify the role and influence of the some actors on the choice of a PMS, it depends on an interpretative paradigm that can explain "situations and behaviors from an individual's point of view". Therefore, we privilege the qualitative methodology through a multiple case study comparison to understand the emergent similarities and differences (Yin, 2003) . Data analyses were provided by the TOSMANA Software for qualitative research and in particular case studies.
Results and discussions
We precede our main discussion by an analysis of the main characteristics of the two heterogeneous healthcare contexts that we consider:
 In Belgium, the responsibility for elaborating the healthcare regulations is in the hands of the  The Lebanese healthcare sector stands for a highly fragmented system. Despite the presence of a high level of technology and many qualified private practitioners, this sector combines several governmental, not-for-profit and private for-profit financing methods. This is explained by the absence of the public involvement. Therefore, the role of the NGOs and private hospitals is extremely important.
Indeed, the lack of control and supervision has induced progressively the concept of privatization and governmental private contracts, considering that public hospitals are non-compliant with the market principles. In the mid-nineties, the government elaborated a first reform plan, assisted by a World Bank loan. However, under political pressure, this plan was inefficient and was replaced by an accreditation system that emphasizes the allocation of budgets (Jardali, 2007). Hence, this evolution has sustained the promotion of the traditional MCS within healthcare. To meet the accreditation standards, the Lebanese hospitals promote their internal policies and their managerial tools to preserve their public arrangements and their main sources of funds (Ammar, et al. 2013 ).
In both sectors, the multiple tasks that are kept in the hands of every HCO illustrate its perceived ability to attract significant resources and to handle the multiple environmental constraints. Adapting its internal climate, structure and level of technology to these elements becomes then a fundamental concern as it can initiate a strategy-focused organization.
To present the results of our case studies, we now use three summary tables, that compare (both across and within) the two healthcare contexts with four complementary perspectives: the ownership perspective (public/private; network membership), the role of stakeholders (authorities, administrators and personnel), the organizational attributes (size, life-cycle, structure and technological platform in use) and the adopted management tools (MCS/ MAS or PMS). We present our results from purely university hospitals (Table 1) , from general university hospitals (Table 2 ) and then from general hospitals (Table 3) . Table 1 compares the role of the healthcare player's in two university hospitals. In both cases, authorities and administrators are committed to promote the traditional tools. However, the personnel's perception had restricted or sustained the implementation process, in some departments. Table 2 , we were able to conclude that in six
 Case studies in university hospitals (U1 and U2):
 Case studies in general/ university hospitals (GU): out of
Belgian cases the government's intervention in the healthcare management is increasing the pressure on most healthcare authorities, who are concerned with their strategic positioning and image or perception.
Accordingly, healthcare authorities have shaped the organizational life-cycle, size (number of beds) and stage of development by elaborating network arrangements that emphasize specialization. However, they are concerned with their buildings' renovation more than committed to efficient management tasks. Healthcare administrators adopt then formal structures to associate the operational level with the support activities relying on their managerial profiles. They require the collaboration of the medical staff to develop further complex MIS. But, they are restrained by some lack of financial resources and by medical professionals who compete to preserve their independent status.
On the other hand, we highlight the authorities' private ownership and the weakened interventions by the government in four general/university Lebanese hospitals. In fact, the private ownership dominance guarantees the availability of resources, the excellence of research, teaching and training for the medical specialists and the high level of care quality. The healthcare administrators are granted then with some extent of autonomy, but have to highlight their managerial competencies. Hence, they develop several support departments to promote the accountability, transparency and compliance with the accreditation standards.
 Case studies in general hospitals (G): out of Table 3 , we illustrate that in five Belgian cases, the authorities (private and/or public) are rearranging their institutions in network memberships, designed to centralize the support administrative activities and to create poles of references for technical activities. However, their organizational goals are not achieved yet. In many cases, the relocation, the renovation of buildings and the innovation of new technical equipments are delaying the managerial processes. Healthcare administrators are then using dissimilar and diverse tools to manage departments, to justify costs and to monitor the quality of care. But, this new vision of centralization increases the pressure on the medical personnel.
As for five Lebanese general hospitals, the private medical or religious ownerships and the international partnerships are dominant. The private ownership has emphasized the adoption of innovative MCSs to reflect the overall healthcare performance in terms of quality and safety.
Healthcare managers are granted by some extent of autonomy. They are required to increase the demand and attract further customers to make use of the available medical equipments.
Conclusion, limitations and future research
Monitoring the hospital's performance is evolving over time in search of more efficiency by integrating additional levels of care, reducing costs and keeping stuff up-to-date. To fulfil these three potentially divergent aspects and to monitor performance, healthcare administrators are using dissimilar MCSs. In Table 4 , we suggest a summary of our hypotheses and main findings.
At the industry level, our results highlight the role of the government as an owner, regulator and supervisors of healthcare resources. To favor patient safety, they promote the use of the traditional tools when impulsing a PMS. From a patient perspective, Belgian patients benefit from a free choice of provider, a full access and a very high quality/safety of care, while the Lebanese patients depend on their social status to access care in a private dominant sector.
In both sectors, the healthcare authorities remain an essential key player affecting the resources, the life-cycle and size, the structure and stage of development and the managerial decision-making process within each hospital. They are influenced by the social and political factors that consider the Board as being responsible for responding and implementing the public policies. This fact induces competing interests and goal ambiguity between the boards' members (communities and public associations).
Healthcare administrators embark then upon divergent extents of autonomy. They need to rely on their leadership style and managerial processes (profile, competencies and perception of uncertainty) to promote their traditional tools. However, they need to be aware that their decision-making can sometimes be restrained by: Table 4 . Qualitative approach: summary table of our hypotheses and findings. Figure 1 . A contingent model illustrating the relationship between multiple healthcare stakeholders and their choice of a contemporary performance monitoring system.
ILLUSTRATIONS
